Nigeria’s Bandit Crisis: An overview of Causes, Methods and Mitigations

Written By Ethan Davies


Introduction

Banditry has become a serious national security issue in Nigeria, with the National Counter Terroism Centre (2019) reporting that banditry accounts for 40% of incidents of national insecurity. Banditry encompasses various crimes including kidnapping, armed robbery, international prostitution, people smuggling, and online fraud, however this report will focus on kidnapping. Despite the aims of the 2019 National Security Strategy, the situation has not improved, and kidnappings continue to cause severe psychological, economic and social dysfunction in Nigeria. This report aims to assess the underlying causes of Banditry and kidnapping, determine their methods, and elucidate who is most at risk. Finally, the effectiveness of existing mitigation and response strategies will be evaluated. 

Definitions

This report distinguishes between banditry, insurgency, and terrorism. “Banditry” refers to armed criminal activity primarily motivated by financial gain, namely kidnapping for ransom. “Insurgency” refers to organised armed groups seeking to challenge state authority through sustained violence, as exemplified by jihadist groups operating in north-eastern Nigeria. “Terror” is used in line with ACLED’s behavioural definition, describing the deliberate targeting of civilians, including through kidnapping, regardless of ideological motivation.

Causes of Banditry and Kidnap 

1. Poverty is a leading cause of criminality in Nigeria. It is estimated that 46% of the population, roughly 70 million people, live at or below the poverty line which is set at 1 USD per day (Bello 2022). Young, unemployed men make up the majority of Bandits, and exposure to wealthy lifestyles via the internet fuels resentment (Osumah & Aghedo 2011,Ibrahim & Mukhtar 2017). Nigeria consistently fails to provide adequate education and post graduate opportunities. It suffers with mass unemployment, homelessness, and a weak social infrastructure that prevents citizens from developing their livelihoods (Nwokeocha 2021).

2. Islamic extremism is a major source of instability in the North East. JAS and ISWAP are the jihadist groups responsible for much of the banditry in Borno state. Both groups are descended from Boko Haram who perpetrated Chibok kidnappings in 2014 (International Crisis Group 2024). In the last two decades, Kidnapping has become a central aspect of terror financing. Government efforts to curb terrorist cash flows through the 2011 Terror Act and the Financial Action Task Force have had unintended consequences. By cutting off access to foreign finances, jihadist groups have turned more heavily to armed robbery, and kidnapping to fund their operations (Isiaka & Ojedokun 2024). 

3. Corruption is rife in the government, law enforcement and security services, hindering capacity to prevent and react to instability (Transparency International 2024). While corruption prevents adequate law enforcement, and creates an atmosphere of criminal impunity (Sheu & Ogunsola 2024), it also directly contributes to the issue of kidnapping. Politicians, religious leaders and bankers are known to collude with criminal gangs to extort and threaten their opponents, or to profit financially (Osumah & Aghedo 2011). 

Methods 

Various methods are employed by bandits to kidnap their targets. Most kidnappings involve a gun to ensure the victim’s compliance (Tade et al 2020). However the specifics of the kidnap vary widely, often some level of manipulation is involved; kidnappers have been known to impersonate police officers, or to approach as potential business interests before subduing and kidnapping the victim (Tade et al 2020, Otu et al 2021).Alternatively kidnappings can be extremely violent as is often the case in Borno state where ISWAB and JAS frequently raid villages for the purpose of pillaging and abduction (Olaniyan 2018). Schools are frequently targeted in mass kidnapping events which are well planned, often occurring against lightly protected institutions in the early morning or late evening (Soufan Center 2025). Road blocks and diversions are also typical set-ups for kidnapping, especially in remote areas (Tade et al 2020).

Broad Assessment of Risk

At the macro-level it is difficult to isolate the risk profile of specific demographics. While Sportsplayers, politicians, businessmen, foreign travellers and NGO workers may receive more attention from bandits due to their perceived wealth and ransom opportunities (Osumah & Aghedo 2011), targeting is not limited to wealthy or foreign populations. Bandits have demanded ransoms as high as several hundred million Naira, and as little as ten thousand (5 GBP) (Nwokeocha 2021). 

Reliable, disaggregated data on kidnapping is available from SB Morgen, while ACLED (2025) provides data on regional Terror incidents. ACLED defines Terror as a behaviour, rather than an ideology, which can be used by insurgents to achieve their objectives. It is characterised by the deliberate targeting of civilians, including kidnapping. An analysis of both data sets reveals some valuable conclusions.  The North West appears to carry the highest burden of Terror, with Zamfara and Katsina being the most affected. The North East has a comparably few total Terror events, though Borno state is affected due to the ongoing jihadist insurgency. This pattern is consistent with external evaluations which suggest that Zamfara and Katsina have come under de-facto Bandit control (Soufan Center 2025). Importantly, this data reflects organised criminality, but does not necessarily measure uniform exposure. Terror events may be spatially concentrated, or repeated against a small proportion of communities.

Detailed risk profiling is warranted, however it falls outside the scope of this report. Kidnapping risk is highly conditional on personal circumstances, gender, financial status and location, and cannot be accurately assessed on the macro scale. More granular analysis would require geographically and population specific analysis to produce meaningful risk evaluations.

Mitigation Strategies

  • In 2022 the Nigerian Government officially criminalised the payment of ransom money through an amendment to the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2013 (Onireti 2022). The amendment stipulates that any person found guilty of paying ransom to kidnappers, terrorists or criminals are liable for imprisonment of no less than fifteen years. Despite this, ransom payments have continued; between July 2023 and June 2024 approximately ₦1,048,110,000 (540,000 GBP) was paid in ransoms (SBM Intelligence 2024). According to the data below the number of kidnap victims has risen dramatically, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of this strategy. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission criticised the amendment, stating that ransom payments should be subject to vetting and tracking rather than criminalisation (Onureti 2022). 

  • The Safe Schools Initiative 2015 aimed to reduce the vulnerability of school children throughout the country. Recommendations of the initiative included the provision of armed guards, the creation of school security plans, the relocation of children from high risk areas and provision of quality education to those living in IDP camps (GBV Education 2024). The initiative has shown some success by providing students, teachers and administrators with emergency preparedness training, and increasing resilience through community engagement (Bakwaph et al 2025)

  • Several military and police operations have been carried out in an attempt to curb Bandit activity. Operation Crocodile Smile attempted to drive Bandits from the Niger Delta, while Operation Dole Lafiya sought to end jihadist occupation of the Sambisa Forest in Borno State (Olaniyan 2018). Security operations are sporadic, and ad-hoc, but rarely lead to the permanent cessation of banditry or insurgency in the area (Olaniyan 2018). 

Recommendations Reflected in Literature

The mitigation strategies implemented are often reactive or preventative, tending to treat banditry and kidnap events in isolation. Strategies focus on reducing vulnerability through displacement of Bandits and insurgents or by moving potential victims to safer areas, or otherwise guarding them in place. 

The mitigations discussed fail to address the underlying causes of banditry and instability. Recommendations should focus on reducing poverty, inequality, corruption and ethnic or religious tension. Sheu & Ogunsola (2025) called for Nigeria to prioritise transparency, accountability, and the equitable distribution of resources. In order for Nigeria to overcome these systemic issues it must develop trust in its institutions. Security infrastructure should not be ignored, it should be modernised with up-to-date crime detection, prevention and management strategies. In addition security personnel must be given adequate training and compensation (Osumah and Aghedo 2011). 


References

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Ethan Davies